Here is an interesting case arising from the search of a 13-year-old  child that occurred in close proximity to the report of drugs being made available at a public school.  The child was initially questioned, but denied any involvement in the illicit activity.   Although, she did acknowledge that the principal had her day-planner which contained an assortment of knives and lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette.    When the search of a back pack did not reveal any contraband, the school  principal directed the child be strip-searched; no contraband was found.  
    The child’s mother complained and pursued a claim for compensation.
    In its review, the Supreme Court recalled that  a careful balancing of governmental and private interests is needed where the Fourth Amendment right to privacy is implicated.   The court again acknowledged that, when warrantless searches occur in a school setting, the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard  that is less stringent than in law enforcement stops.  Instead of a  “fair probability,” or a “substantial chance,” of discovering evidence of criminal activity, the High Court noted that a reasonable warrantless search in a school setting requires only a “moderate chance” of finding evidence of wrongdoing.   More importantly, the Court reaffirmed that the search, as actually conducted, must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the search in the first place.    In sum, and what was missing from the facts in the instant case,  was any indication of the level of danger to other students from the power of the drugs or their quantity.  Neither was there any reason to suppose that the child was carrying pills in her underwear.  
    The Court did acknowledge that, like parents concerned for their own children, school officials may sometimes “overreact to protect their children from danger.”  Even with the high degree of deference to the educator’s professional judgment, the High Court stated,  the Fourth Amendment does place limits on official conduct.    The Court clarified that the limitation for school searches requires that the most intrusive of searches must be supported by a showing of great urgency either because of the danger presented or a  more specific suspicion of illegal conduct. 
    The Court cited to precedent and affirmed that  school officials are  to limit the intrusiveness of a search, “in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”    When a school official acts reasonably under the circumstances the official is entitled to qualified immunity.    In this case, the High Court noted that the school officials did not have a clear standard to operate from and, thus, were entitled to immunity.   The school itself, however, may still be subject to liability and the matter was remanded for that purpose. 
    Justice Thomas, who dissented, in part, urged a return to the earlier times when the common-law doctrine of “in loco parentis” controlled.     Under that retired standard, the judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine business of school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain order. . . .   But,  Justice Thomas seems to have forgotten that  not all parents think alike.
     Neither the decision, nor the dissent, indicates whether the 13-year-old child was, in fact, disciplined for smoking or carrying knives to school before her mother filed suit.